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Some Thoughts of Gramsci 
In his writings on political conflicts in nineteenth-century 
. A  Italy, Antonio Gramsci returned repeatedly to the relations of rural 
and urban populations. He had before him the model of the Jacobins 
duriilg the French Revolution '! . .who succeeded in crushing all the 
Right parties over to the Girondins on the agrarian question, and 
not only to forestall a rural coalition against Paris but to multiply 
their own supporters in the provinces. . ." (Gramsci 1949: 104). 
The comparison remained at the core of his conception of the rivoluzione 
mancata: the social revolution which could have occurred during the 
creation of a unified Italian state, but failed to happen. 
In pursuing this problem, Gramsci developed two important ideas 
about rural-urban political relations. The first is a political dis- 
tinction between industrial and non-industrial cities. The industrial 
city, Gramsci tells us, is "always more progressive than the countryside, 
which depends on it organically" (Gramsci ' 1949 : 95). -Hence a revo- 
lutionary movement which sweeps industrial cities draws in their 
hinterlands as well. The non-industrial city is different, at least 
in Italy. "In this type of city there exists," Gramsci writes, "an 
ideological unity from which even the nuclei which are most modem 
because of their civic functions (although such modem nuclei do, 
in fact, exist) don't escape: it is hate and disdain for the serf, 
an implicit united front against the demands of the countryside, which 
would, if granted, make that type of city impossible" (Gramsci 1949: 
95-96). In the North, Gramsci saw the industrial city as already 
dominant in the nineteenth century. In the South the anti-rural city 
and the anti-rural sentiment prevailed. 
To the distinction between the political orientations of in- 
dustrial and non-industrial cities, Gramsci added an idea which was 
later to occur to Lin Piao: 
In the Risorgimento, furthermore, one. can already see 
the embryonic development of the historical relationship 
of North and South as like the relationship between a 
great city and a great rural area. . .(Gramsci 1949: 96). 
The rural-urban relationship Gramsci had in mind here was one of 
domination and exploitation. Thus the rural-urban division within the 
South and the rural-urban division between the South and the North 
blocked that union of the oppressed which alone could have .brought 
. . ab6ut a social revolution. 
In this analysis, Gramsci's idea of "rural" and "urban" did not 
depend on the conventional statistical standards: size and density. 
There are other frequently-used criteria. We can find specialists 
using a settlement's position in some spatial hierarchy of activities 
as a criterion of its urbanity--with places which serve as centers 
for the widest range of activities and/or" for the largest geographic 
areas considered most urban. Others use the population's orientations 
and life styles as the tests. Still others focus on the structure of 
social relations in the settlement: the more differentiated, the more 
urban; the less agricultural, the more urban; and so on. Gramsci's 
own ideas of "rural" and liurban" come closest to the last category. 
In essence, areas in which the basic social relations are built around 
control of the land qualify as rural, in his treatment; they qualify 
whether they are large or,small, whether everyone is a farmer or not. 
To be more accurate, Gramsci's basic distinctions depend on 
the relations of production. The cities of the South were the places 
such as Palermo or Naples where resided those numerous gentlemen and 
merchants who drew their principal incomes from ownership of the soil 
but took no direct part in its cultivation. .'In 'the settleinents of the 
countryside were the thousands of landless and land-poor workers who 
actually planted, tilled and harvested. The ". . .demands of the 
countryside, which would, if granted, make that type of city im- 
possible. . " were, of course, demands for redistribution of the land. 
The rural-urban division he portrayed was a class division as well. 
The comparison between the cities of South and North becomes the 
comparison between "parasitic" and "generative" cities, a comparison 
which numerous analysts of the non-western world have made in recent 
decades. And the treatment of the relationship between North and South 
as an urban-rual relationship likewise calls attention to its exploita- 
tive character. 
In these terms, then, Gramsci's analysis of nineteenth-century 
Italy presentsa clear and forceful model of the political relations 
between town and country. To the extent that the prevailing rural- 
urban division separates exploited agricultural workers from their 
exploiters, it tells us, we should expect little collaboration between 
rural and urban classes and little common action from the necessarily 
fragmented countryside, despite the probability of widespread conflict 
on a local scale. A revolutionary movement is only likely to bring 
town and country together where the town is already serving as a 
generator of rural activity. And in a predominantly agricultural 
country the revolution is likely to fail if an effective rural-urban 
coalition of the exploited classes does not appear. 
The Gramscian Questions 
The problem of the rivoluzione mancata raises a series of 
questions about town and country in revolution: 
1) Do rural and urban populations flay characteristically 
different roles in revolution? 
2) What difference to the outcome of a revolution do the 
extent and character of rural-urban cleavage make? 
3) To what extent, and how, does the character of rural-urban 
division in an area affect the likelihood of revolution in that 
area? 
. . 
With some extrapolation, Gramsci's analysis of nineteenth-century Italy 
yields interesting answers to all four questions. 
What does Gramsci say about the first question: the charac- 
teristic roles of city and country in revolution? The country 
struggles over control of the land, while the city struggles over 
control of labor. The interests of the "subaltern classes" of town 
and country are necessarily different, although they are not necessarily 
contradictory. The two are only likely to act in concert when united 
a) by some linking organization, b) by a common opposition to the 
dominant classes and to their instrument, the state. 
What difference to the outcome of a revolution do the extent 
and character of rural-urban cleavage make? That is where Gra.msci 
begins. If rural-urban cleavage is great, a successful revolution is 
less likely; the cleavage separates the natural revoluti.onaries, the 
exploited classes of town and country, from each other. This is, 
however, quite an extrapolation of Gramsci's analysis, since he was 
analyzing cases in which both town and country did have important 
political roles. 
Finally, to what extent--and how--does the character of rural- 
urban division in an area affect the likelihood of revolution in that 
area? We need another extrapolation: All other things being equal, 
the more thoroughly the influence of cities pervades the countryside, 
the more likely is revolution. Revolution, in this case, is the 
effective transfer of power to a new class. Rebellions of different 
sorts are quite likely to occur where the working classes of city and 
country are insulated from each other. But an effective transfer of 
power requires a union of the two. 
Notice that Gramsci avoids two altemative simplifications which 
have been common in recent analyses of Asian rebellions and revolutionary 
movements: 1) assuming a one-to-one relationship between the extent 
of grievance, exploitation or hardship and the degree of rebelliousness, 
2) treating the involvement in rebellion of any particular population 
as a measure of the effectiveness of a revolutionary organization 
(or, for that matter, of a counter-revolutionary organization) in 
dealing with that population. Either one can, of course, become true 
by definition; all it takes is an appropriate criterion for "grievance" 
in the one case and for "effectiveness" in the other. But we 'have 
plenty of analyses which go directly from imputed motives to action, 
on the one hand, and from organizational effectiveness to revolutionary 
success, on the other, without passing through tautology. 
In the case of Viet Nam, ~tchellts well-known effort to relate 
insurgency to equality of land distribution (or, more precisely, control 
by the South Vietnamese regime to inequality, tenancy, previous French 
ownership, and so on) is an example of the first simplification. As 
Sansom points out, a more plausible interpretation of the same findings 
takes into consideration the strategy of the "insurgents," the effects 
of their land - redistribution where they gained control, and the dis- 
tinction between the grievances of an area's tenants and the political 
alliances of its landlords (Sanson 1970; Paige 1970). Gramsci was 
aware that an elite could persist in the face of mass hostility so long 
as the mass had no organizational focus and no external allies. 
The analysis of Leites and Wolf illustrates the second simpli- 
fication. (Leites and Wolf wrote Rebellion - and Authority in an 
abstract, generalizing-style, but with Viet Nam very much in mind.) 
Explicitly challenging the "hearts-and minds" version of the first 
simplification, they reach such conclusions as: 
Politically, the capabilities that A must develop and 
demonstrate involve the capacity to act with speed, con- 
sistency, and discrimination. More specifically, A must 
protect the population; identify desired behavior and 
reward it by effective programs; and withhold such 
programs in areas that have failed to perform in desirable 
ways. A must demorlstrate a capacity to act with discrimina- 
tion and restraint, basing its action on legal and orderly 
processes that provide a contrast to the putative ille- 
gality and disorder of R (Leites and Wolf 1970: 154). 
II 11 A and "R" are, of course, Authorities and Rebels. ~eites and Wolf 
make concessions to the demands of potential rebels,,but emphasize 
the tactical importance of the supply of rewards and punishments. The 
rewards and punishments are, Leites and Wolf point out, much more 
elastic than the demands. 
Such an organizational argument underestimates the extent to 
which rebels know where their interests lie, and match them with the 
long-run programs (not just the current tactics) of one side.or the 
other. It also assumes that the national government recognize2 by 
outsiders as the government has the advantage of legitimacy, or at 
least of priority. Gramsci, by contrast, assumed that each class 
had a vision and a memory: helped by its avant-garde, it was aware 
of its long-run interests, acted on them when it could, but often 
lacked the means of effective action. "No mass action is possible," 
he declared, "if the mass itself isn't convinced of the ends to be 
accomplished and of the means to be applied" (Gramsci 1951: 20). 
Gramsci worked out most such arguments concretely, with 
Italian problems in view. One example is his treatment of the position 
of the socialists around the turn of the century: 
The insurrection of the Sicilian peasants in 1894 and the 
rebellion of Milan in 1898 were the crucial experiment 
for the Italian bourgeoisie. After the bloody decade of 
1890-1900, the bourgeoisie had to gibe up an overly ex- 
clusive, overly violent and overly direct dictatorship: 
both the southern peasants and the northern workers 
rebelled against them simultaneously, if not in concert. 
In the new century the dominant class inaugurated a new 
policy of class alliance, of class political blocs, that 
is of bourgeois democracy. It had to choose: either 
rural democracy, an alliance with the southern peasants, 
a policy of low tariffs, universal suffrage, administra- 
tive decentralization, low prices for industrial products, 
or a capitalist-worker industrial bloc without universal 
suffrage, for protectionism, for the maintenance of state 
centralization (an expression of bourgeois domination over 
the peasant, especially in the South and the Islands), 
for a reformist policy on wages and unionization. Not 
by chance, it chose the second solution; Giolitri 
personified bourgeois domination, and the Socialist part 
became the means of Giolittian policy (Gramsci 1951: 22). 
Gramsci assumes that the interests and demands of the major classes are 
known, but their political outcome is much in doubt. The work of a 
revolutionary party is to mobilize them, synthesize them, and subordinate 
them to a general revolutionary program (see Cammett 1967: 174-176). 
~ramsci's analyses have their inconvenient side. Although he 
has much to say about the objective interests and demands of p~rticular 
classes, he offers no general fornula for calculating them. We can't 
move easily from Gramsci's reasoning to generalizations about the 
revolutionary potential of different kinds of workers or different 
kinds of peasants. Nor does he have much to say in general about the 
kinds of countries or the stages of development which are especially 
favorable to rebellion and/or revolution. His life and thought 
centered on strategic questions: most of all, how to build a revolution 
with the materials provided by different forms and stages of western 
capitalism. For the rest, we must go back to Marx or forward to Mao. 
In dealing with our three questions, then, Gramsci provides 
us with a good start, but no more than that. He aims us away from 
a the analysis of short-run fluctuations in hardship, of expectations, 
of tradition, and toward the analysis of class, power, organization 
and communication. The main task of this paper is to present an 
analysis of town and country in revolution which is Gramscian in tone, 
if not in detail. 
The analysis has three layers. First comes a stark presenta- 
tion of a general argument, which includes some defining of terms and 
some elementary model-building. Second, a brief discussion of the way 
the argument applies to the European experience from which it is 
derived. Third, some suggestions as to the possible applicati~n of 
the argument to the collective actions and revolutionary involvements 
of Asian peasants. 
Europe and Asia 
. . - .. . . 
'Before the analysis, a warning. I make no claim that the Asian 
situation today corresponds closely to the European situation at any 
time in the past. I explicitly reject the idea of standard paths of 
"political developmentu which make it possible to anticipate the 
experience of "backward" countries by scrutinizing the experiences 
of "advanced" countries (see C. Tilly 1974a). It is possible that the 
generalizations I propose--however valid they may be for the European 
past--have no relevance whatsoever to contemporary Asia. 
Let's remember what Europe was like. Five hundred years ago, 
the European population was, compared to the rest of the world, 
relatively prosperous, predominantly peasant, fairly homogeneous from 
a cultural point of view. In these respects, Europe as a whole re- 
sembled China, and faintly resembled India or Japan. (The comparison 
of the continent of Europe with the subcontinent of China makes sense, 
since in 1500 each had something like 100 million people spread over 
about 4 million square miles.) However, Europe--again, as compared 
with the rest of'the world of 1500--had an extensive network of 
cities and a series of elites strongly connected by kinship,'b:y 
political alliance and by economic interdependence, yet had rather 
weak structures of patronage and of corporate kinship. Local 
communities, as such, played.an exceptionally significant part in the 
collective lives of Europeans. That was partly because of the weakness 
of patronage and corporate kindship, partly because of the historical 
importance of the parish and the manor as units of settlement, ad- 
ministration and collective action. 
y~ 
Most of the European territory had, of course, once fallen 
under the control of a single empire governed from Rome. The empire 
had left its mark on language, religton, social relations and lines of 
communication. By 1500, however, the territory was broken up into 
hundreds of separate political units. Although the many governments 
overlapped and depended upon one another, at least 'five hundred 
different rulers exercised some kind of sovereignty somewhere in Europe. 
Despite the power of the Habsburgs and the pretentions of the Holy 
Roman Emperor (at that time ordinarily a Habsburg himself), no single 
political organization outweighed all the rest. 
In these respects, Europe differed significantly from China, and 
from Japan as well; in 1500 it was, perhaps, closer to India. The combina- 
tion of weak patronage, weak corporate kinship, relatively homogeneous . 
culture and territorial communities which were prominent as units of 
solidarity and collective action distinguished. Europe from most of Asia. 
There were, to be sure, similarities in individual items: local communities, 
for example, appear to haveshad exceptional salience -as units of collec- 
' .  
tive action in Viet Nam and (at least fron.Tokugawa times) in Japan. Any 
.comparison in which one term contains a quarter of the world's population 
(Europe) and the other tern half the world's population (Asia) will suffer 
many exceptions. Nevertheless, the interesting combination of homogeneity, 
interdependence and political fragmentation sets Europe off from most of Asia 
After 1500, a few of the hundreds of governments became the 
cores of expanding national states. The next three centuries brought a 
tremendous consolidation, centralization, elaboration and increase in 
power of state structures. By the late nineteenth century, the political 
map of Europe had simplified into a few dozen territorieswith well , 
established sovereignty. These national states had grown up in con- 
junction with capitalism, industrialism and urbanism. The exact con- 
nections of statemaking with these other' phenomena are still debatable. 
Still, it is clear that the states had come to form a system: they 
were tightly interdependent, exercised collective control over each 
others' claims outside their o h  territories, monitored entries into 
and exits from statehood, comprised a well-established hierarchy, 
warred with each other within constraints set by that hierarchy (but 
also as a means of adjusting the hierarchy), and depended on a con- 
i :  
tinental division of economic labor. The European states jointly 
imposed their power on much of the rest of the world. They exported 
the particular political forms of their own state-system into the 
territories they conquered. The nearly continuous rise of states and 
of a state-system was therefore the fundamental political fact for 
Europe over the centuries after 1500, in much the same way that the 
waxing and waning of successive empires was the fundamental political 
fact for China until at least the middle of the nineteenth century. 
. . All this means that anyone who wants to generalize from the 
European political experience to that of Asia wil1:probably do better 
with China, Japan or India than with other parts of Asia, but will 
probably not do very well even there. The generalizations will have 
to make allowances for the residues of empire in Europe, for the 
relative strength of local communities, for the relative weakness of 
patronage and of corporate kinship, for the long, thorough concentra- 
,tion of power in national states. My modest hope for relevance hangs 
on two possibilities: 1) that the sorts of guestions one can ask 
fruitfully about the European experience are worth asking in Asia as 
well; 2) that some of the general relationships suggested by a Grarnscian 
analysis hold widely, even if the concrete sequences, issues, alliances 
and outcomes are quite different from the ones Gramsci studied. In 
pursuing these two possibilites, I will make no attempt to build up 
an original analysis or a compelling body of evidence. Instead, I 
will draw freely on other analyses in this volume and on standard 
treatments of China, Japan, Viet Nam and a few other parts of Asia. 
Concepts and Arguments 
Within any arbitrarily defined population, we may identify at 
least as many possible social categories as there are possible com- 
binations of all the status distinctions made by members of the popula- 
tion. At any given point in time, the members of the population are 
only distinguishing a small proportion of all those categories from 
each other. Only a small proportion of those active categories, further- 
more, consist of people who are exerting collective control over 
resources. They ire groups. .We may call an increase in a group's 
collective control over resources mobilization, and a decrease de- 
mobilization. To the extent that a group applies resources to a common 
end, it carries on collective action. To the extent that it applies 
those resources to influence governmental action, it is contending 
for power. We have a sort of political continum: no category/ -
category/group/collective action/contention for power. We will add 
to the continuum in a moment. 
Within the arbitrarily defined population, we can also locate 
the principal concentrated means of coercion. If there i s  -am organiza- 
tion which controls that concentrated means of coercion, it is a govern- 
ment. (If there is no such concentration or no organization controlling -
it, there is no government; if there is more than one organization 
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controlling the concentrated means.of coercion, there is more than one 
government; to the extent that the. organization is centralized, 
autonomous and differentiated, and the territory it controls con- ' . 
' tiguous and bounded, the organization is a state.) Over some ar- 
bitrarily defined period of time, we can observe the interactions 
between the government and the population under its control. As 
I have already said, any group which collectively applies resources 
to influence the government during that period, is a contender for 
power. Some contenders have routine means of making claims on the 
0 0  government which are accepted by other contenders and by agents of 
the government; collectively, such contenders make up the polity 
related to a particular government; individually, we call them members 
of the polity. Jointly (but usually unequally) the menbers control 
the government. Contenders which do not have routine, accepted means 
of making claims on the government are not members of the polity; they 
are challengers. 
Every polity has its own rules of membership. Established ways 
in which challengers become members, and vice versa. How those rules 
vary, and how hard or easy they make changes in membership are among 
the prime problems of comparative politics. However, the rules of 
admission operating at any particular time appear to depend heavily 
on the past history of admissions to the polity. They almost always 
include the requirement that the contender demonstrate control over 
extensive resources, especially manpower. By and large, existing 
members of a polity resisc new admissions; they work to have the rules 
applied stringently. Yet at times a member forms a coalition with a 
challenger: the member gains access to resources under the challenger's 
0 
control, as the challenger gains a degree of protection from repression 
and a degree of support in its bid for membership. Members test each 
other intermittently, and individually resist loss of membership in the 
polity. 
Whatever else they do, then, governments extract resources 
from the populations under their control, apply the resources to ac- 
tivities favored by the members of the polity, and constrain the col- 
lective action of contenders--especially of challengers. To the extent 
that any governmental activity raises the cost of collective action, it 
is repressive. The quintessential repressive forces are armies, police 
and intelligence nets; they specialize in raising the cost of collective 
action to one group or another. In some circumstances, bandits, pirates, 
private armies, secret societies and other nongovernmental groups con- 
trolling substantial means of force align themselves conditionally with 
governments and become significant repressive forces; those circum- 
stances appear to have occurred more frequently in Asia than in Europe 
over the last few centuries. Nevertheless, in Europe as well as in 
Asia, such irregulars have often played crucial roles where gavercunental 
authority was weak or divided. 
If we wanted to know how repressive a government was in general, 
we would have to a) choose some particular contender as our point of 
reference, and assay the net effect of governmental activity on its 
collective action or b) sum over all contenders, making allowances for 
the variable effects of the same governmental action on different 
groups. In a situation of competition, for example, raising the cost 
of collective action to one contender will automatically lower the 
cost of co.llective action to at least one other contedder. 
This dense series of abstractions opens the way to intezesting 
hypotheses about collective violence, and then ahout revolution. Up 
to this point the statements have been almost purely definitional. From 
here on the frequency of definitions declines, and the pack of general- 
ization rises. As the generalizations begin, I should emphasize again 
that they come mainly from European experience since 1500. That is the 
only experience I have studied seriously in this regard. Nor can I 
guarantee that they hold up in every particular for Europe itself. 
They merely sum up my current understanding of what happened there. 
My suggestions concerning Asia, then, are the reflections of an in- 
terested outsider. 
Forms of Collective Action 
In the European experience, three fundamental forms of collective 
action (each with many variants) have led to violence. The first form 
we can call competitive: members of a group which defines another 
particular group as an enemy, rival or competitor act to control the 
resources.oE that enemy-rival-competitor. The action may consist of 
damaging, seizing, asserting a claim to, denying the other's claim to 
or blocking access to the resources in question. Thus armed peasants 
attack the farms of large landlords, two groups of bandits fight with 
each other, one carpenters' society interrupts the annual procession 
of a rival carpenters' society. 
The second form is reactive. After some group, or its agent, 
lays claim to a resource currentlyunder control of another particular 
group, the members of the second group resist the exercise of that 
claim. The response of the second group is reactive. Thus villagers 
bar the recruiters who have come to claim their young men for the 
army; members of a national assembly drive out a crowd which has 
sought to take the assembly's place; a new landlord fences in port 
of the commons, and the users of the commons tear the fence dcwn. 
While the competitive forms of collective action have a high 
probability of producing violence (in the sense of damage or forceful 
seizure of persons or objects), these reactive forms may well be non- 
violent. The resistance may consist of the filing of a legal action 
or an appeal to friends in power; it may consist of shouts and symbolic 
acts; it may consist of concealing the resources or withholding in- 
formation about them. Just so long as a group does these things 
together, they qualify as collective action. 
The third form is proactive. It involves an initiative on the 
part of theqacting group. Some group carries out an action which, 
under the prevailing rules, lays claim to a resource not previously 
accorded to that group. If 'collective violence occurs, it. character- 
istically begins when at least one other group intervenes in the action 
and resists the claim. As a consequence, of two struggling groups, one 
will often be carrying on a proactive, the other a reactive, form of 
action. Some examples of proaction: strikers seize possession of a 
mine, organized squatters move onto vacant land, a junta declares it- 
self the new government. 
I n  a l l  three forms, t h e  "resources" involved cover cpit-2 'a 
range: they inc lude  land,  people, p r i v a t e  spaces,  r i g h t s  t o  a c t  i n  
c e r t a i n  ways. The competi t ive,  r e a c t i v e  and p roac t ive  forms. resemble 
each o t h e r  i n  cen te r ing  on the  sequence: 
ASSERTION CHALLENGE 
OF CLAIM '-> TO CLAIM 
But they d i f f e r  considerably wi th  r e spec t  t o  t h e  cu r ren t  s t a t u s  of 
t h a t  claim and who i s  making it: Is t h e  claim new?' Are t h e  resources 
a l ready i n  p a r t i c u l a r  hands? 
The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  p o s i t i o n  of a u t h o r i t i e s  is  t o  dec la re  (and 
p e r h a p s - t o  be l i eve )  t h a t  competi t ive a c t i o n  i s  t h e  predominant source 
of v io lence:  members.of a group which de f ines  another  p a r t i c u l a r  
group ( including t h e  government) a s  a r i v a l ,  competitor o r  enemy 
a t t a c k  t h e  resources  of t h a t  r i v a l  o r  enemy. Author i t i e s  tend t o  
favor  such an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  because a )  it i s  p a r t  of t h e  f o l k  concep- 
t i o n  of v io lence;  b) i t  j u s t i f i e s  t h e i r  in t e rven t ion  a s  guardians of 
publ ic  o rde r ;  c )  t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s  exclude se izu re  and damage performed 
by agents  of t h e  government--police, t roops ,  and so on--from t h e  
category of "violence"; d) t h e r e  is ,  i n  f a c t ,  a broad d i v i s i o n  of 
labor  between contenders and government: contenders a r e  somewhat 
more l i k e l y  t o  a t t a c k  resources ,  governmental r ep ress ive  fo rces  t o  
a t t a c k  persons. 
In  t h e  European experience s i n c e  1500, t h e  r e a c t i v e  and pro- 
a c t i v e  forms of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  have played a much l a r g e r  p a r t  i n  
the  production of v io lence  than has the  competi t ive form. The 
repress ive  fo rces  of  European s t a t e s ,  furthermore, have played an 
e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y  l a r g e  p a r t  i n  them. To be more p rec i se ,  the  recent  
European experience f a l l s  i n t o  t h r e e  rough phases: 
1. Into the seventeenth century: Local and regional rivalries 
of varrous kinds play the major part in collective violence. 
Competitive action appears as vendetta, competition among 
groups of craftsmen, religious wars, dynastic struggles, 
intercommunal rivalries, and so on. 
2. Seventeenth to nineteenthcenturies: As the local claims 
of agents of national states, of large organizations and of 
international markets increase, reactive collective action 
comes to predominate as the context for collective violence. 
Tax rebellions, food riots and movements against military 
conscription become the most frequent types. 
3 ,  Nineteenth and twentieth centuries: Once the predominance 
of these national and international structures is assured, 
the focus shifts to proactive forms. Contenders make new 
claims, and others--especially repressive forces.of the 
state--resist them. Strikes, demonstrations, coups become 
characteristic £oms of collective action, and characteristic 
settings for collective violence. 
\ If this summary is correct, governments and their agents are not 
simply onlookers, arbiters or cleaners-up in collective violence. 
They are often major participants in the action. Governments often 
lay new claims which other parties challenge. Governments often 
resist the exercise of new claims. In war and elsewhere, governmerlts 
often play a major part in violence among rivals and enemies--at 
the extreme, arrogating to themselves the sole right to employ force 
in such encounters. 
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The t h r e e  forms a r e  so  broad t h a t  they mLght seem, l i k e  t h e  
d e f i n i t i o n s  l a i d  out  e a r l i e r ,  t o  exhaust the  l o g i c a l  p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  
They don ' t .  A l l  t h r e e  forms r e l a t e  mobilized groups t o  each o the r .  
They exclude a c t i o n  by chance crowds, by the  genera l  populat ion and 
by t h e  disorganized c a s t o f f s  of r o u t i n e  s o c i a l  l i f e .  By tkie same 
token, they exclude random, express ive ,  purely d e s t r u c t i v e  a c t s .  
I f  my summary of  t h e  European experience is  adequate, indeed, 
s e v e r a l  d r a s t i c  conclusions concerning conventional ways of analyzing 
c o l l e c t i v e  v io lence  follow: F i r s t ,  t h e r e  i s  no reason t o  th ink  t h a t  
c o l l e c t i v e  v io lence  should covary wi th  murder, su ic ide ,  t h e f t ,  family 
i n s t a b i l i t y  and o t h e r  f o m s  of behavior which a u t h o r i t i e s  commonly 
lump together  with i t  under t h e  heading of "disorder." Second, 
e f f o r t s  t o  reason from s i t u a t i o n s  of  hardship,  r e l a t i v e  depr ivat ion ,  
r ap id  change o r  d i s s o l u t i o n  of s o c i a l  t i e s  t o  some form of d iscontent  
and .thence t o  v io lence  a s  a  form of "protest"  a r e  doomed t o  f a i l u r e ;  
v io lence  i s  a by-product of an i n t e r a c t i o n  r a t h e r  than a  d i r e c t  ex- 
press ion  of t h e  p ropens i t i e s  of one of t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  t h e  i n t e r -  
ac t ion ;  furthermore, most of these  condi t ions  tend t o  demobilize t h e  
s o c i a l  groups they a f f e c t .  Third, t h e r e  :is an in t ima te  dependency 
between v i o l e n t  and nonviolent  forms of c o l l e c t i v e  action--one is  
simply a  s p e c i a l  case  of the  other--rather  than some moral, p o l i t i c a l  
o r  t a c t i c a l  d iv ide  between them. A s  a  c o r o l l a r y ,  the  forms of v i o l e n t  
a c t i o n  any p a r t i c u l a r  group c a r r i e s  on bear s t rong marks of t h a t  group's 
day-to-day organiza t ion ,  ins t ead  of f a l l i n g  i n t o  a  s p e c i a l  realm 
governed by t h e  laws of "co l l ec t ive  behavior" o r  "aggression." 
The typology of forms rests on t h e  argument t h a t  c o l l e c t i v e  
v io lence  r e s u l t s  pr imar i ly  from tfte i n t e r a c t i o n  of contenders f o r  
power (sone of them often acting via the government instead of inter- 
vening directly in the action) which are engaged in dgsputes over 
rights and justice. In that case, a valid theory of collective violence 
will be a special case of a general theory of collective -- action. In 
modern Europe, the rules governing that special case have to do mainly 
with the ways governments exercise their extractive and repressive 
powers: mobilization, collective action and contention for power on 
the one side, governmental extraction and repression on the other, 
the interplay between the two producing variations in the frequency, 
intensity and character of collective violence. 
This formulation has sone resemblance to Samuel Huntington's. 
He treats political "stability" as an outcome of the balance between 
popular mobilization and governmental institutionalization. The 
situations in which governments are multiple, fragmented or weak 
relative to',other concentrations of coercive power, however, resist 
that simple formulation. They are, as it happens,'precisely the situa- 
tions which are likely to interest the student of nineteenth-century 
Italy or of contemporary Asia. They are also, as we shall see, similar 
in important regards to revolutionary situations. To the extent that 
governments are multiple, fragmented or weak relative to other concen- 
trations of coercive power, we may expect them a) to be involved in 
competitive collective action as rivals of other governments and quasi- 
governments, b) to become coalition partners with the exploited con- 
tenders in reactive collective action involving rival governments and 
quasi-governments, c) to seek to stabilize and make exclusive their 
control over the populations under their .immediate jurisdictions by 
means of stalemates and coalitions holding off the adjacent concentra-. 
tions of coercive power. 
Under such circumstances, a nice paradox will emerge: since 
only a ininority of these concentrations of power will receive the con- 
secration of political scientists, historians or other governments as -. 
genuine governments, a great deal of conflict will involve nominally 
private violence; yet the governments and quasi-governments will play 
an even larger part than usual in the collective violence which 
actually occurs. This is, I think, the normal situation where secret 
societies, organized bandits and phenomena like Mafia prevail (see 
Blok 1973). 
The concentration of coercive power is an essential part of 
the formation of national states. It reduces the importance of com- 
petitive collective action as the matrix of violence within the 
territory in question, accelerates reactive collective action as 
different groups resist the expansion of the state's powers of 
coercion and extraction, and eventually produces a transition to 
proactive collective action. Competitive collective action producing 
violence then survives mainly in the guise of wars aniong states-- 
which is to say that the total amount of destruction produced by 
competition may well increase, despite any implications of my argument 
that the transition is orderly and benign. 
All this is a far cry from conventional analyses of revolution. 
I hope to show, however, that some of the processes we have been 
discussing are revolutionary processes. They are revolutionary when ' 
they appear in the proper combinations. 
To show that, I'm afraid that 1 have to continue the con- 
ceptualizing a bit longer. Let us refashion  rots sky's useful notion 
of dual sovereignty. A revolution occurs when a government previously 
under the control of a single, sovereign polity becomes the object of 
effective, competing, mutually exclusive claims on the part of two or 
more distinct polities, and ends when a single polity regains control 
over the government. Mast readers will reject that definition because 
it doesn't correspond to their intuitive notions of revolution. But 
some will reject it as too broad; they want a genuine transformation of 
social structure, a massive realignment of social classes or a movement 
with a program to have a part in the process. Others will reject it 
as too narrow; they want to include transfers of power and transforma- 
tions of social life which occur without any apparent break in the con- 
tinuity of government. Still others will ask for a sideward displace- 
ment of the definition: away from a strongly political conception . 
toward one which emphasizes control over the means of production, 
states of consciousness, or something else. 
The largest disparities in definitions of revolution come from 
the time spans the definers want to consider. In a short time span, 
we have definitions which concentrate on a central event: a certain 
kind of bid for power, a temporary dissolution of government, a transfer 
of power. In a medium time span, we have definitions which examine 
the population or government before, during and after such a crucial 
event, and ask whether any significant change occurred; a .coup d'gtat 
which substituted one military faction for another might qualify as a 
revolution under the short-run definition, but not under the medium-run 
definition. Long-run definitions, on the other hand, relate the 
crucial event and.the changes (if any) surrounding it to a reading 
of hroad,llistorical. trends--for example, by restricting the name of 
& 
revolution to those transfers of power k h i c ~  produce the durable sub- 
stitution of one whole class,for another. 
$:t 
In general, the longer the time span, the fewer events will 
qualify as revolutions. The long time span, however, does raise the 
logical possibility of a gradual revolution, or at least of one in 
which the transformation occurs without violence and without an 
apparent break in political continuity. As Maurice Meisner suggests 
elsewhere in this volume, Marxist definitions of revolution refer to 
long spans of history, even where the crucial transformations are 
supposed to take place rapidly; Mao's "populist" version of revolution 
requires a very long time span indeed--and restricts the number of 
revolutions which have so far occurred to zero or one. 
Despite a great interest in the long-run transformations, I 
choose the short time sapn, The political definition of revolution 
as multiple sovereignty a) is the closest thing we have to common ground 
among numerous competing conceptions, b) permits the creation of all 
other standard definitions and types by means of further specifications, 
c) escapes the more obvious difficulties--tautology, limitation to 
post factum'explanation, dependence on relatively inaccessible features 
of the phenomenon to be defined, etc.--of common definitions of 
revolution, d) hooks together neatly the analysis of revolutionary and 
non-revolutionary political action. 




1. The members of one polity seek to subordinate another 
prevfously dtstinct polity; where one of the polities is 
not somehow- subordfnate to the other at the outset, this 
circumstance falls into a gray area between revolution and 
war. 
2. The members of a previously suboidinate polity assert 
sovereignty. 
3. Challengers form into a block which seizes control over 
some portion of the governnental apparatus. 
4. A polity fragments into two or more blocs, each exercising 
control over some part of the government. 
Anger, revolutionary plans, the broadcast of claims, even widespread 
collective violence are not enough. In any of these versions, the 
revolution begins when previously acquiescent people begin taking 
orders from a new authority. It ends when only that authority, or only 
one of its rivals, is giving orders that are obeyed. Of course, this 
way of stating the problem requires us to set some minimum to the 
number of people, the range of orders, and the degree of obedience. 
The necessity simply.calls attention to the kinship between revolu- 
. . 
tionary and nonrevolutionary situations. 
The analysis so far identifies three conditions as necessary 
for revolution, and a fourth as strongly facilitating. The necessary 
conditions are: -9 first the appearance of contenders, or coalitions 
of contenders, advancing exclusive alternative claims to the control 
' over the government currently exerted by the members of the p~lity 
(the contenders in question may consist of, or include, some members 
of the polity); second, commitment to those claims by a significant 
.+' 
segment of the subject population; third, incapacity or unwillingness 
of the agents of the government to suppress the alternative coalition 
or the commitment to its claims. The facilitating condition is the 
formation of coalitions between members of the polity and the con- 
tenders advancing the alternative claims--coalitions which ally the 
members with the alternative bloc without committing them completely 
to it. /- 
/" This statement of proximate conditions for revolution does 
not contain much analytic news. It is essentially an explication of 
the definition offered earlier, in terms of the concepts laid out 
before that. Nevertheless, it orients the search for explanations 
of revolutXon. It orients the search away from the assessment of 
aggregate characteristics of the population--levels of tension, dis- 
affection, deprivation and the like--toward patterns of mobilization, 
=ollective action and contention for power. That 'is, I think, an 
advance. 
Every element of this scheme needs refinement, criticism and 
confrontation with the facts. This is not, however, the place to 
undertake a general review of its adequacy. (For more of that, see 
Tilly 1974b.) The point is to use it as a means of analyzing the 
roles of town and country in revolution. 
Although that is a big problem, it is far smaller than a 
general analysis of revolution, or even of the conditions under which 
peasants or workers join (or make) revolutionary movements. The main 
thing we are trying to do here is to specify what effect the rural- 
urban relations prevailing in a population have on the likelihood of 
a revolution i n  t ha t  population, and on the form and outcome of the 
revolution,  i f  i t  occurs. 
Perhaps the answer is: none. The r e g u l a r i t i e s  i n  revolution- 
ary  processes may l i e  elsewhere. But i f  the  character  of rura l -  
urban resa t ions  has no regular e f f e c t s  on the l ikelihood, form or  
outcome of revo lu t ion , , then  Gramsci wasted a good deal  of h i s  ana ly t ic  
e f f o r t ,  and a l o t  of other theor ies  w i l l  have t o  bq revised. However 
the  inquiry comes out,  i t  i s  therefore  worth trying.  
Le t ' s  r e tu rn ,  renewed, to  the  questions we extracted from 
Gramsci ea r ly  i n  the discussion: 1 )  Do r u r a l  and urban populations 
play cha rac t e r i s t i c a l l y  d i f f e r en t  r o l e s  i n  revolution? 2) What d i f fe r -  
ence to  the outcome of a revolution do the  extent  and character  of 
rural-urban cleavage make? 3) To what extent ,  and how, does the 
character  of rural-urban divis ion i n  an area  a f f e c t  the l ikelihood of 
revolution i n  t ha t  area? In e laborat ing new concepts and def in i t ions ,  
I have s h i f t e d  away from Gramsci's view of revolution a s  the e f fec t ive  
t r ans f e r  of power from the rul ing c lasses  t o  the "subaltern" c lasses .  
But the re  i s  no reason why we can ' t  ask both versions of the  bas ic  
questions: about revolution as  mul t ip le  sovereignty, and about revo- 
l u t i on  a s  an e f f ec t i ve  t rans fe r  of power. Gramsci's question pre- 
supposes mine. 
Let me o f f e r  quick comments on the  f i r s t  two questions, then 
expand on the th i rd .  
Different  Roles f o r  City and Country,? 
Our i n i t i a l  question has a t  l e a s t  two in t e r e s t i ng  var iants .  
F i r s t ,  over and above the e f f e c t  of the pre-exist ing rural-urban 
I 
div i s ion  on the character  and l ikel ihood of revolution,  what d i f ference 
.-- 
does i t  make t o  the  workings of a r e v o l u t i o n  whether the. chief  l o c a t i o n s  
o d % e  a c t i o n  a r e  r u r a l  o r  urban? Second, given the  f a c t  of r ~ v o l u r i o n ,  
do s y s t e m a t i c a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  t h ings  happen i n  urban and r u r a l  a r e a s ?  
A l o t  depends on how much t h e  ins t ruments  of  government a r e  
concent ra ted  i n  c i t i e s  and towns. ~ h r o u g h o u t  most of  t h e  world,  admin- 
i s t r a t o r s ,  r e p r e s s i v e  f o r c e s  and means of  government i n  gene ra l  concen- 
trate i n  urban l o c a t i o n s .  They gene ra t e  urban l o c a t i o n s ,  f o r  t h a t  
ma t t e r ,  where they go. A s i a  is no except ion .  There, d e s p i t e  t he  
overwhelmingly r u r a l  locus  of t he  popula t ion ,  governmental organiza- 
t i o n s ' h a v e  long based themselves mainly i n  c i t i e s .  
I n  gene ra l ,  t h e  l a r g e r  governments have d e a l t  w i t h  t h e  country- 
s i d e  i n d i r e c t l y ,  by means of some s o r t  of compact w i t h  r u r a l  l andlords .  
I n  Japan, John W. H a l l  shows us  t h e  Tokugawa regime d i s p l a c i n g  t h e  
Samurai t o  c a s t l e  towns, and c u t t i n g  them o f f  from e f f e c t i v e  c o n t r o l  
of t h e  land. 'But  t he  ove r lo rds  then  became the  p i v o t s  of t h e  system. 
They were the  Japanese Junkers:  o f f i c i a l s  from one angle,  g r e a t  
l and lo rds  from another .  The ove r lo rds  then  r e l i e d  on v i l l a g e  headmen 
t o  extend t h e i r  r u l e  i n t o  r u r a l  a r e a s ;  t h e  headmen, a s  c h i e f s  of major 
l i neages ,  were i n  e f f e c t  s u b s t a n t i a l  l a n d l o r d s  (Smith 1966: 59) .  I n  
such a system, the  i n d i v i d u a l s  a t  each l e v e l  down from t h e  top have 
cons ide rab le  autonomy w i t h i n  t h e i r  own sphe res ,  y e t  c o n t r o l  resources  
and coerc ion  wi th  the  backing of t hose  h ighe r  up. That p u t s  them' i n  
a good p o s i t i o n  t o  r e b e l ,  and sometimes o f f e r s  them the  i n c e n t i v e  t o  
do i t .  But: i n  t he  same s o r t  of system a r e b e l l i o n  whose ch ief  a c t i o n s  
t ake  pla'ce i n  towns and c i t i e s  is l i k e l y  t o  be i n  c l o s e r  con tac t  w i th  
t h e  ins t ruments  of government from i t s  i n c e p t i o n  than one whose a c t i o n s  
. a r e  primar:ily r u r a l .  
Remember the  four  paths t o  mul t ip le  sovereignty: 1) the  
members of one p o l i t y  seek t o  subordinate  another  previously d i s t i n c t  
p o l i t y ;  2)  the  members of a  previous ly  subordinate p o l i t y  a s s e r t  
sovereignty;  3) chal lengers  form i n t o  a  b loc  which s e i z e s  con t ro l  over 
some por t ion  of t h e  governmental appara tus ;  4) a  p o l i t y  fragments i n t o  
two o r  more b locs  each exerc i s ing  c o n t r o l  over some p a r t  of the  govern- 
ment. The r u r a l  o r  urban locus probably does not  a f f e c t  the  l ike l ihood 
of path 1. But i t  mat ters  t o  the  o t h e r  three.  
Path 2, which i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  s e p a r a t i s t ,  is  a  l i k e l y  path f o r  
predominantly r u r a l  a r e a s  which a r e  a l ready organized i n t o  subordinate 
p o l i t i e s .  I n  A s i a  those r e b e l l i o u s  subordinate p o l i t i e s  have o f t en  
been composed of l i n g u i s t i c  and r e l i g i o u s  minor i t i e s  which have 
managed t o  c r e a t e  o r  r e t a i n  t h e i r  own instruments of government: h i l l  
peoples i n  Viet  Nam, Chinese i n  Indonesia and Malaya. The o the r  major 
Asian form has been t h e  p o l i t y  c o n t r o l l e d  by a  success fu l  warlord,  
v a s s a l  o r  f r o n t i e r  commander, a s  i n  the  mul t ip le  governments which 
asse r t ed  themselves i n  Japan before  the  ~ i~kugawa  ascendancy. 
Path 3  ( i n  which the  powerless r i s e  up and take over-a 
f a v o r i t e  image and a r a r e  'occurrence) r equ i res  o f fens ive  mobil izat ion.  
It is ,  I th ink,  only l i k e l y  t o  occur i n  a r e l a t i v e l y  urban s e t t i n g ,  
where chal lengers  can use dense, c e n t r a l i z e d  means of comunicat ion  
and organiza t ion  t o  e s t a b l i s h  con tac t  with each o ther .  Donald 
Zagoria 's  enumeration of condi t ions  f o r  success of Communist leaders  
i n  Asian r u r a l  a reas  (elsewhere i n  t h i s  volume: t h a t  the  l eaders  have 
semi-rural o r i g i n s ,  e s t a b l i s h  l i n k s  with the  r u r a l  i n t e l l i g e n t s i a ,  
do t h e i r  homework, be f l e x i b l e ,  g ive  p r i o r i t y  t o  r u r a l  p rob lem)  i s  
p laus ib le .  But those condi t ions  are unl ike ly  t o  lead  t o  revolut ion  : 
except where such l e a d e r s  a r e  we l l  l inked t o  urb'an bases.  
The l ike l ihood  of the  four th  path (one p o l i t y  fragmenting i n t o  
two o r  more) is  probably i n d i f f e r e n t  t o  the  u rban i ty  o r  r u r a l i t y  of 
the  s e t t i n g .  Yet i ts  exact  course does seem t o  d i f f e r  along the  urban 
continuum. We can p r o f i t a b l y  diht_jnguish be tween center-dut and 
periphery-in revolut ions :  a )  the  a l t e r n a t i v e  c o a l i t i o n  f i r s t  estab- 
l i s h i n g  c o n t r o l  a t  major cen te r s  of governmental power and then 
extending c o n t r o l  i n t o  the  r e s t  of the  t e r r i t o r y ,  b )  the  a l t e r n a t i v e  
c o a l i t i o n  f i r s t  e s t a b l i s h i n g  i t s e l f  i n  a r e a s  of r e l a t i v e l y  weak 
governmental power and then c los ing  i n  on the  power cen te r s .  Center- 
out  has been t h e  s tandard  p a t t e r n  i n  modern European revolut ions .  
There, the  rees tabl i shment  of c e n t r a l  con t ro l  over the  periphery has 
o f t e n  taken a  g r e a t e r  e f f o r t  than the  i n i t i a l  s e i z u r e  of power a t  the  
center .  
Twentieth-century g u e r r i l l a  doc t r ine ,  on t h e  o the r  hand, has 
c a l l e d  f o r  periphery-in revolut ions .  Asia has the  prime example of 
China t o  p u l l  i t  i n  t h i s  d i r e c t i o n .  But the  Huks i n  t h e  Ph i l ipp ines ,  
the  Viet  Minh i n  Viet Nam and the  Malayan People 's  Anti-Japanese 
Army a l l  moved t h e  same way. Although the re  have been p lenty  of 
center-out r evo lu t ions  i n  modern Asia--the mul t ip le  coups of ~ f ~ h a n -  
i s t a n ,  Burma o r  China being f i n e  examples--on balance Asia has been 
more hosp i t ab le  t o  periphery-in revolut ions  during the  l a s t  few 
cen tu r i e s  than Europe has. No doubt the  overwhelmingly r u r a l  charac ter  
of the  Asian popula t ion  has something t o  do wi th  i t .  The r e l a t i v e  
weakness of c e n t r a l  governments and the  p r i o r  ex i s t ence  of subordinate 
p o l i t i e s  b u i l t  around common b e l i e f s ,  languages and systems of k insh ip ,  
however, probably account more directly for the difference between 
Asia and Europe. , 
In highly urban settings, only the center-out pattern has 
much chance to occur or to succeed. Where rural area and population 
are extensive, both center-out and periphery-in revolutions occur, 
depending on the degree to which communications channels, supply lines, 
means of coercion and sheer territory are under the control and sur- 
veillance of cities; the less effective and centralized the control, 
the more possible a periphery-in revolution. The bulk of periphery-in 
revolutions, however, probably follow path 2: a previously subordinate 
polity (for example, the "native" segment of a colonial government) 
asserts its own sovereignty. 
Given the fact of revolution, do systematically different 
things happen in urban and rural areas? Gramsci gave us the general 
teaching: the population of the city struggles over control of labor, 
while the population of the country struggles over control of land. 
That is broadly true in A d a  as well as in Europe. Yet it becomes 
less true in the very cases orywhich Gramsci pinned his greatest revo- 
/,' 
lutionary hopes: where urban labor markets have penetrated farthest 
into the countryside. Where wage-labor has become dominant in the 
x 
country as well as the city, we may find collective drives for 
'", 
collective control of the land, but we should not expect to find col- 
1ective.drives for individual control of the land. 
Up to this extreme, we should expect to find the people of 
the countryside, in times of revolution, mobilizing more slowly than 
the people of town and city--and demobilizing more rapidly than them 
as well. That, for two reasons: first, because mobilization is 
intrinsically easier, all other things being equal, at centers of 
communication than in peripheral locations; second, because demands 
for control of the land are on the whole more local in scope ('hencz 
a less steady ground for a wide coalition) than demands for control 
of the conditions of labor. Jean Chesneaux summs up the for 
China : 
The peasantry showed itself especially capable of 
carrying on the mass armed struggle against the 
national enemy. Nevertheless, peasant intervention 
remained within geographically limited areas; that 
is as true of.the Boxer movement or of the areas of 
peasant agitation against the Manchus in southern 
China before 1911 as of the guerrilla bases of the 
period 1937-1949. The very nature of technological 
and economic relations within the peasantry (small- 
scale cultivation, semi-autarky, weakly-developed 
flows of commodities and information) did not permit 
it to carry on a unified struggle at the scale of the 
whole country, with, for example, the range of the 
gr.eat "pan-chineset' strikes of June 1925. When that 
level was reached (for example at the end of the war 
against Japan) it was because a political apparatus 
which reached beyond the peasantry gave it direction 
(Chesneaux 1971a: 577). 
Governments.can equalize the rural-urban balance either by concentrating 
their repression in cities or by attacking whatever local control of 
the land exists, and there'by increasing the incentives to reactive 
collective action. 
Rural-Urban Cleavage and Revolutionary Outcomes 
What difference do the extent and character of rural-urban 
cleavage make .to the outcome of revolutions? We can distinguish three 
broad alternative outcomes of multiple sovereignty: 
1. The pre-existing polity reappears approximately as before, 
or minus former members who had joined the alternative polity; 
most observers would call this a,"l&t" revolution; 
2. an alternative polity establishes control of the 
government and of the population subject to it; most observers 
would consider this revolution to have "won", although some 
would want evidence that the new holders of power were going 
to act in the interests of the population they represented; 
3. some members of the alternative polity which produced 
the revolutionary situation, with or without members of the 
pre-existing polity, establishes control of the government 
and of the population subject to it, while other members of 
the alternative polity lose their membership as the new 
regime consolidates its hold; this is the most common 
revolutionary outcome; it is also the one which incites the 
angriest debates about whether the revolution has "won" or 
"loStll. 
The burden of the earlier Gramscian analysis is that sharp.rura1- 
urban cleavage favors the first outcome (6  "lost" revolution), a 
coalition involving newly-mobilized rural populations and well- 
organized urban revolutionaries favors the third outcome (a revolution 
"won" for somk and "lost" for other's), and the revolutionary rural- 
urban coalition is only likely to continue into power in an unusual 
circumstance: when the countryside is durably organized on a large 
scale. Japanese rebellions illustrate the lost revolution. The 
Chinese communist revolution provides the best example of rural-urban 
,success. And India's drive to independence. (despite its rural dgcor) 
provides us with an exemplary case of mixed-urban success and rural 
failure. 
3' 
On t h e  whole, the  ~ r a m s c i a n  genera l i za t ions  s t and  up w e l l  
f 
t o  Asian experience. The g r e a t e s t  doubt a t t a c h e s  t o  t h e  f i r s t ,  
proposi t ion:  t h a t  sharp rural-urban cleavage favors  l o s t  revolut ions.  
A t  l e a s t  one s e t  of condit ions appears t o  be favorable  a t  once t o  
b i t t e r  rural-urban c o n f l i c t ,  t o  mul t ip le  sovereignty and t o  t r a n s f e r  
of power: t h e  s i t u a t i o n  i n  which an urban-based government faced with 
a well-organized opposi t ion i n  i t s  own cen te r s  a t tempts  t o  s t e p  up the  
pace, o r  change the  charac ter ,  of i t s  demands on a s o l i d a r y  r u r a l  
population. This  s i t u a t i o n  promotes a l l  the  b a s i c  condi t ions  of 
revolution--formation of an a l t e r n a t i v e  p o l i t y ,  commitment t o  i t s  
claims, r ep ress ive  incapaci ty  of the  government, and c r e a t i o n  of 
c o a l i t i o n s  between members of the  a l t e r n a t i v e  and pre-exis t ing  p o l i t i e s .  
Again China i s  the  type case--but t h i s  time the  revolut ion  of 
1911 i s  the  re l evan t  rno.ment. In t h e  Waichow r i s i n g  of 1911, f o r  
ins tance ,  winston Hsieh shows us a  c o a l i t i o n  of clan-feud bands, l o c a l  
m i l i t i a s  and secre t -socie ty  troops a c t i n g - t o g e t h e r  a g a i n s t  the  r i s i n g  
Ch'ing p ressure  f o r  tax  revenues, e s p e c i a l l y  f o r  revenues from the  
s a l t  monopoly. I n  Hsieh's view, the  Tr iads  (who were c lose ly  connected 
with the  salt-smugglers of the  region) played the  c r u c i a l  connective 
r o l e  i n  t h e  upr is ing .  Furthermore, they c a r r i e d  out  the  major p a r t  
of the  a c t i o n  i n  the  market towns and the  c i t y ,  
There a r e ,  i t  appears, more paths  t o  the  c r u c i a l  rural-urban 
c o a l i t i o n  than v i a  the  c i t y ' s  revolut ionary  i n d o c t r i n a t i o n  of the  
peasantry.  Gramsci does not  q u i t e  prepare us f o r  the  s a l i e n c e  of 
s e c r e t  s o c i e t i e s  i n  Chinese insur rec t ions .  Perhaps t h a t  i s  because 
the  band i t s  and mafiosi  of ~ r a m s c i ' s  I t a l y  genera l ly  played a conser- 
v a t i v e  p o l i t i c a l  game, surviv ing through the  patronage o r  indulgence 
of the powers that were. In Asia, one of the paths to rural-urban 
coalition depends on the prior existence of large networks of bandits 
or secret societies which are opposed to the government and well- 
connected in both rural and urban areas.   hey substitute, to some 
degree, for a revolutionary party. 
A more general condition.for rural-urban coalition lies 
behind both the cases of which ~ramsci was aware and the different 
circumstances of bia. Under most forms of predominantly agrarian 
social organization, a single local elite controls the major links 
between any particular rural area and the national structure of 
power. Most often it is a-landowning elite. So long as the elite is 
in place and has effective ties.to the national structure, no large 
:, mobilization of the' countryside occurs without their collaboration; 
.: P 
&it is probably for two related reasons: 1) because the rest of the 
rural population has so much invested in their patronage and good 
will, 2) because the national ties permit the.elite to call on 
punishing force' to put down opposition. 
. 
When the ties of the local elite weaken-however that happens-- 
the costs of independent mobilization go down as its possible benefits 
. . 
rise. The Tokugawa regime deliberately undercut the position of the 
samurai, and thereby facilitated the independent mobilization of the 
peasants. The French accomplished the same result unintentionally in 
Viet Nam. As Jeffrey Race describes the process elsewhere in this 
book, French administrative reforms eroded the authority--as well as 
the repressive and cooptative power--of the village council. Thus the 
French unwittingly tipped the balance away from the local elite and 
toward people who could form new structures of collective action. It 
was at that point, according to Race's analysis, that effective anti- 
French organization began to link rural communities to cities as well 
as to each other. 
If the Asian experience identifies the dissolution of the 
national connections of elites as a facilitator of rural-urban coali- 
tion, it also identifies a major obstacle to coalition. That is the 
existence of sharp linguistic, religious and ethnic barriers between 
the rural and urban populations. The great Asian migrations of the 
last few centuries have created many situations in which the rural- 
urban distinction is also largely an ethnic distinction: Malaya, 
Indonesia, Thailand and elsewhere. If Rex   or timer's analysis of 
Sarawak and' Michael Stenson's analysis of Malaya are correct, the 
great urban concentration of the Chinese in both those areas seriously 
hampered the efforts of the communists (who were recruited mainly from 
the Chinese) to organize the countryside. Despite the earlier 
successes of the communists in fronts against the Japanese, and to 
some extent against the British, the urban-Chinese base of the party 
ruined the prospects of its effort, in 1948, to make revolution 
through guerrilla. 
Generally speaking, rural revolutionaries who want to win 
need urban allies more than urban revolutionaries need them. An 
independent rural group can initiate multiple sovereignty with relative 
ease. But how will it end? Coalition with urban allies provides the 
the coordination and communication necessary to transcend the village 
or the region, and thence to produce a transfer of power at a national 
level. It facilitates the transition from reactive to proactive 
movements, to movements which will not dissolve when the first round 
of demands has  been met. It a l s o  makes access  ' t o  armed f o r c e  
e a s i e r .  
The last  p o i n t  i s . n o t  i n c i d e n t a l .  No t r a n s f e r  of power i s  
l i k e l y  un le s s  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  c o a l i t i o n  acqu i r e s  c o n t r o l  of substan- 
t i a l  armed f o r c e  e a r l y  i n  t he  r evo lu t iona ry  process  (Russe l l  1973). 
That can happen through o r g a n i z a t i o n  of a  r evo lu t iona ry  army, through 
t h e  abso rp t ion  of e x i s t i n g  armed i r r e g u l a r s ,  o r  through t h e  d e f e c t i o n  
of governmental t roops .  A l l  t h r e e  happened i n  China. None of t he  
t h r e e  happened i n  Indonesia .  A s  Rex Mortimer s e e s  i t ,  t h e  Javanese 
communists opted f o r  a d a p t a t i o n  and shor t - run  success  and d i d  w e l l  by 
i t ;  b u t  t h e  a d a p t a t i o n  s t i f l e d  t h e i r  r evo lu t iona ry  p o t e n t i a l .  One of 
t h e  ways i t  d i d  s o  w a s  by denying them any s t r o n g  armed f o r c e  when 
a m i l i t a r y  coup came t o  d i s lodge  bo th  them and t h e i r  a l l y ,  Sukarno. 
These r e l a t i p n s h i p s  change ove r  t h e  course of u rban iza t ion  and 
of s t a t e  c e n t r a l i z a t i o n .  Urban a l l ies  f o r  r u r a l  r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s  become 
more probable,  b u t  a l s o  more ind i spensab le .  I n  a  fundamental ly  urban 
popula t ion ,  t h e  e x t e n t  and c h a r a c t e r  of rural-urban c leavage  does not  
much a f f e c t  t h e  outcome of such r e v o l u t i o n s  a s  may occur.  I n  a 
s t r o n g l y  c e n t r a l i z e d  s t a t e ,  l i kewise ,  what happens a t  t h e  per iphery  
m a t t e r s  l i t t l e  t o  those  who can s e i z e  the  c e n t r a l  appara tus ;  they 
may l o s e  some of t he  per iphery ,  b u t  they won't be d is lodged  from 
power. ( I t  probably fo l lows  t h a t  t h e  more c e n t r a l i z e d  a s t a t e ,  a l l  
o t h e r  t h ings  be ing  equa l ,  t he  more l i a b l e  i t  i s  t o  m i l i t a r y  coups.) 
I n  a fundamentally r u r a l  popula t ion ,  on the  o t h e r  hand, those  towns 
t h a t  do e x i s t  c a r r y  a l a r g e  s h a r e  of t h e  burden of admin i s t r a t i on ,  
coo rd ina t ion  and communication. Yet they remain h igh ly  vu lne rab le  t o  
t h e  withholding of s u p p l i e s  of food, goods, manpower and information.  
As the population approaches the rural extreme, then, transfers of 
power are likely to be.fairly easy to accomplish so long as the 
rural population remains passive. But given the mobilization of the 
rural population or the involvement of a rural elite which retains 
effective control over the rest of the population, the winning 
coalition--whether "revolutionary" or l'counter-revolutionary"--will be 
the one that unites rural and urban contenders. 
Rural-Urban Division and the Likelihood of Revolution 
So far, for the most part, we have taken the presence of 
revolution for granted, and have asked what difference the rural- 
urban configuration makes to the way a revolution works itself out. 
Now we must ask whether the rural-urban configuration affects the 
probability that a revolution will occur at all. Remember that we 
are entertaining two different definitions of revolution: one as the 
onset of multiple sovereignty, the other as a durable transfer of 
power. The conditions for one are not the same as the conditions for 
the other. Nor is one simply an extrapolation of the other. In fact, 
they are partly contradictory: many of the circumstances which 
promote the onset of multiple sovereignty frustrate the durable 
transfer of power, and vice versa. 
Strictly speaking, rural-urban divisions are probably 
irrelevant to the likelihood of revolution. They become relevant only 
to the extent that they affect (or at least correlate with)' the pre- 
dominant forms of mobilization, collective action, contention for 
power, coalition-formation and repression. The effects and correlations 
have to do mainly with changes in rural-urban divisions rather than 
with stable configurations. 
The most obvious i s  t h e . i n c r e a s e  of urban con t ro l  over r u r a l  
p o l i t i c a l ,  economic and demographic l i f e .  ~ r i c  wol f ' s  Peasant - Wars 
of the  Twentieth Century presents  a s e r i e s  of s t u d i e s  around t h a t  --
theme. Wolf d e a l s ,  of course, wi th  peasant  populat ions,  not  with r u r a l  
populat ions i n  general .  .He por t r ays  a process which has occurred 
widely a t  the  leading edge of c a p i t a l i s t  expansion: the  r i s i n g  demand 
from d i s t a n t  markets encourages l o c a l  c a p i t a l i s t s  t o  accumulate 
con t ro l  over the  land and t o  s h i f t  toward cash-crop production; taxa- 
t i o n  and monetizat ion draw o r  d r i v e  peasants  i n t o  the  market; patron- 
c l i e n t . r e l a t i o n s h i p s  decay; oppor tun i t i e s  f o r  wage-labor simultaneously 
s t imula te  populat ion increase  wi th in  the  v i l l a g e  and inc rease  the  
propor t ion  o f ' t h e  populat ion which is  vulnerable  and responsive t o  
' .L f l u c t u a t i o n s  - i n  the  markets f o r  l a b o r  and commodities; sooner o r  l a t e r  
a t he  a b i l i t y  of peasants  t o  meet t h e i r  major l o c a l  ob l iga t ions  (which 
had been guaranteed by what were, i n  e f f e c t ,  l i e n s  on a l l  the  f a c t o r s  
of production) decl ine.  
These changes may seem s u b t l e  and a b s t r a c  t--only v i s i b l e  i n  
r e t r o s p e c t ,  and then only t o  the  keen eye of an anthropologis t .  Yet 
\ 
they have some p e r f e c t l y  tangible  manifes ta t ions .  They show up a s  
bourgeois encroachment on common lands ,  i.mposition of new taxes  which 
requ i re  peasants  t o  s e l l  p o r t i o n s  of t h e i r  crops o r  of t h e i r  c a p i t a l ,  
and s o  on. By the  e a r l y  twentieth century,  Wolf tells us ,  these  
changes were going on i n  Mexico, Russia,  Viet Nam, China, and many 
o t h e r . p a r t s  of the  world. The analyses  of Asia i n  t h i s  volume tend 
t o  agree. Although Donald Zagoria, f o r  example, emphasizes the  current  
revolut ionary  p ropens i t i e s  of r u r a l  tenants  and p r o l e t a r i a n s ,  the  
processes his survey shows us as creating these. revolutionary classes 
and exacerbating their fates 'Are the same processes Wolf describes. 
By the end of such a process, peasants are no longer peasants, 
and communities have lost their collective capacities to resist. That 
is the dialectic: if the economic, political and demographic threats 
to the survival of the community mount faster than its bases of 
solidarity dissolve, concerted resistance occurs. When a new demand -.. 
for taxes, a new exclusion of peasants from gleaning, hunting or 
gathering on formerly open lands occurs, defensive mobilization begins. 
The collective action which prevails in these circumstances is the 
reactive form outlined earlier (claims over already-controlled resources1 
counterclaim). Jeffrey Race shows us just such a sequence occurring in 
northern Thailand; there government pressure on hill tribes helped align 
them with the rebels and encouraged them to develop supra-village 
organization where none had previously existed. Likewise;Se He Yoo 
suggests that Japanese interference with slash-and-burn agriculture 
helped drive the peasants of Hamyong Province, Korea, into red peasant 
unions. By many standards, these reactive movements are conservative, 
even traditional. Yet, as Wolf and Race demonstrate, they sometimes 
have revolutionary outcomes. Conservatism, tradition and revolution 
are not so incompatible as conventional wisdom holds. 
'When? The basic conditions for resistance are 1) a focussed 
threat to peasant survival, with well-defined agents having visible 
external connections, occurring simultaneously in a number of 
localities which are already in connnunication with each other, 2) a 
significant local framework for collective action, in the form of 
mutual obligations, comunications lines and justifiable common claims 
on resources .  From wol f ' s  accounts  of twentieth-century peasant  wars 
and from a gene ra l  survey of modern European exper ience ,  i t  is  reason- 
a b l e  t o  add a n  important  f a c i l i t a t i n g  condi t ion :  3) t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  
of urban-based a l l i e s  i n  t h e  form of i n t e l l e c t u a l s ,  l i b e r a l  bourgeois ,  
l abo r  l e a d e r s ,  m i l i t a r y  c h i e f s ,  p r o f e s s i o n a l  p o l i t i c o s  o r  o t h e r s .  
The "focussed t h r e a t  t o  peasant  su&ival"  appears  t o  l i e  
behind t h e  widespread,  r e a c t i v e  peasan t  r e b e l l i o n s  of Tokugawa Japan 
(Borton 1937). The Japanese movements a g a i i s  t merchants,  t a x  c o l l e c t o r s ,  
and encroaching l a n d l o r d s  between 1750 and t h e  Mei j i  Res to ra t ion  have 
. . 
many f e a t u r e s  i n  common wi th  European r u r a l  movements of t h e  seven- 
t e e n t h  t o  n ine t een th  cen tu r i e s .  Taxes and r e n t s  do n o t  on ly  b i t e  i n t o  
t h e  peasant  household 's  means of s u r v i v a l ;  when a s ses sed  i n  money, 
they d r i v e  peasan t s  i n t o  t h e  market (Ardant 1965; Ardant 1971-1972). 
Where t h e  terms of t r a d e  a r e  unfavorable ,  t h e  market mechanisms a r e  
i l l -deve loped  o r  customary claims on t h e  commodities t o  be ,marke ted  
a r e  ex t ens ive ,  t h e  n e c e s s i t y  of market ing does more damage t o  t h e  
p,easant household than  a n  equ iva l en t  l o s s  of r e sou rces  through t h e f t  
o r  n a t u r a l  d i ~ a ~ t e r .  
One of  ort ton's many r e l e v a n t  accounts  desc r ibes  an  u p r i s i n g  
of 1823 i n  t he  Province o:E K i i .  " P l o t t i n g  wi th  two of t h e i r  fe l low 
o f f i c i a l s , "  Borton t e l l s  us,  
two of t h e  bugy6 decided t o  s t o r e  goods f o r  t h e i r  own 
p r o f i t .  Rice exchanges were e s t a b l i s h e d  throughout 
t h e  realm, t h e  p r i c e  of s ake  w a s  forced  up, t h e  impor- 
. t a t i o n  of r i c e  from o u t s i d e  w a s  p roh ib i t ed ,  and t i c k e t s  
were r equ i r ed  on a l l  r i c e  bags ,  sake  tubs  and s i m i l a r  
a r t i c l e s  t o  prove t h a t  they had n o t  come from t h e  
neighboring domain of Koyasan. Added t o  t h i s ,  t h e  
t a x a t i o n  of t h e  land w a s  i nc reased ,  wh i l e  t axes  were ordered 
c o l l e c t e d  n o t  .only on new l ands ,  b u t  a l s o  on a l l  waste  
l and  (Borton 1968: 81) .  
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Eventua l ly  more than  100,000 farmers  marched on.Wak'ayama, #"destroying 
t h e  sake  and r i c e  shops,  pawn shops,  and p l a c e s  of t h e  shGya and men 
i n  charge of t h e  r i c e  exchanges" (Borton 1968: ' 82).  On the  evening of 
t h e  a t t a c k  t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s  rece ived  t h e  fo l lowing  demands: 
1. The f i x e d  t axes  be  a s  dur ing  the  time of Tokugawa Yorinobu. . 
2. The t a x  on wet lands .  . . be  s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  on dry  lands .  
3. There be exemption from opening up o l d  was te  land .  
4. There b e  omission of maikuchi. 
5. The s t o r i n g  of goods f o r  p r o f i t  cease.  
6. There be exemption from t h e  r e p a i r s  of water  d i t c h e s  
f o r  i r r i g a t i o n  and dra inage ,  and t h e  c u t t i n g  of t h e  
boundary. . . 
7. In spec t ion  be  made of t h e  s t a n d i n g  crop [ t o  a s s u r e  a f a i r  
t ax ] .  (Borton 1968: 82) ' 
These demands were c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of t h e  t ime ' s  peasant  up r i s ings .  
A s  Bar r ington  Moore s a y s  i n  h i s  review of t h e s e  same accounts  ". . . t h e  
i n t r u s i o n  of commercial r e l a t i o n s h i p s  i n & o  t h e  f e u d a l  o rgan iza t ion  of 
t h e  count rys ide  was c r e a t i n g  i n c r e a s i n g l y  seve re  problems f o r  t he  r u l i n g  
group. There were t h r e e  main s t r a n d s  t o  t h e  peasant  v io lence :  opposi- 
t i o n  t o  t h e  f e u d a l  ove r lo rd ,  t o  t h e  merchant, and t o  emerging land- 
lordism" (Moore 1966 : 256). 
Japanese r e b e l l i o n s  of t h e  e i g h t e e n t h  and n ine t een th  century  
a l s o  i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  importance of a  s i g n i f i c a n t  l o c a l  framework f o r  
c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  A s  i n  Europe, t h e  v i l l a g e  was both a f i s c a l  u n i t  
and the  possessor  of c o l l e c t i v e  r i g h t s  t o  t h e  land .  And i t  remained 
a v e h i c l e  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  Th i s  appears  t o  s e t  o f f  r u r a l  Japan 
from most of China. I n  China, communities as such had r e l a t i v e l y  
little collective life, few common rights, and not much collective 
action. Kinship groups and secret societies (the two not being 
entirely distinct from each other), by contrast, seem to have played 
. . 
extraordinary roles in collective action; they cut across individual 
communities, and facilitated actions on a scale larger than the 
village. 
Perhaps I have misstated the contrast. Following G, W. Skinner, 
it might be better to distinguish between the bottom-up system of 
central places exemplified by the hierarchy of market areas and the 
top-down system of administrative units doing the work of the empire. 
The Chinese imperial structure did not ordinarily reach down to the 
level of the village, however heavy was the indirect weight of imper- 
ial demands. The smaller-scale governments of Europe--and apparently 
of Japan and India as well--managed to incorporate villages directly 
into their structures. They became fiscal, administrative and even 
military units; the administrative pressure enhanced their importance 
as vehicles of collective action, ironically fortifying the resistance 
to the very extractive processes which built them up. 
In China, secret societies and the rebellions associated with 
them rarely began with whole communities, but they did rely heavily 
on local units. According to Chiang Siang-Tseh (1954: 37-38), the 
Nien rebels acquired whole communities under circumstances which fit 
neatly with the top-down/bottom-up distinction. After the govern- 
mental authorities organized local militias in defense against the 
Taipings who were in Anwhei--thus extending the central structure 
downward to an extraordinary degree--the- chiefs of the local militias 
began to assume political power within the villages, and to exercise 
-- 
it with considerable autonomy. In fact, they frequently took the whole 
village over.to the Niens. Philip Kuhn (1970) treats this dialectic 
of government-promoted local militarizat ion/acqui&ion of autonomy by 
military units as one of the chief factors in the final crumbling of 
the empire. The Taipings likewise contributed to their own destruction 
by their extraordinary, revolutionary effort to build a top-down 
structure rivaling that of the empire itself; it was incapable, as was 
the empire, of extending durable control to the village level in the 
face of local defensive militarization. 
The experiences of Japan and china ake alike in underscoring the 
significance of urban-based allies for rural rebelltons. Such allies 
matter because they can make the difference between one more fragnented 
peasant rebellion and a coordinated revolutionry force. The general 
df rebellion in Japan and China was, outsid&-in, or bottom-up: 
first in the periphery and/or the countryside, only later in the cities. 
That is unlike the modern European experience, in which most large-scale 
rebellions had urban bases, regardless of how many peasants they re- 
cruited. But in Japamand China successful rebellions had to take over 
urban centers; control of cities was part of the definition of success, 
the only means of seizing or supplanting the existing administrative 
apparatus. 
The Revolution of 1911--which was, 'in its way, successful-- 
provides numerous examples of the advantages of rural-urban alliance. 
John Lust's description of the insurrection in Kwangtung links repub- 
lican Canton with People's Armies of "hired agricultural workers, handi- 
.discharged troops, local banditti, and militia" around 
of outlaws, Triads, and peasants" led by "T'ung- meng 
f 
Hui.members, by bandit chiefs who had previoisly adopted tlte rep~th- 
lican cause, and by veteran Triad leaders" (Lust 1972: 192-193). The 
description resembles Hsieh's portrait of the nearhy Waichow rising. 
As the rebels of Kwangtung won: 
In Canton, as the result of pressures from the bour- 
geoisie, and probably also from chiefs of People's Armies, 
an administration with a strong T'ung-meng Hui representa- 
tion replaced the compromise regime. In the pungent if 
patronizing - mot of the old consul-general, Jamieson, bandit 
armies had put a compradore government into power (Lust 1972: 
193). 
The subsequent effort of the "compradores" to rid themselves of their 
plebeian allies is also a phase familiar to students of western revolu- 
tions. The personnel and organization of Asian revolutions differ 
quite a bit from those of Europe, but the broad conditions for revolu- 
tion in the two continents have something in common. 
The basic conditions for rural resistance--a focussed threat 
to peasant survival, a significant local framework for collective action 
and the availability of urban-based allies--are revolutionary conditions. 
They are revolutionary because they promote the appearance of coalitions 
of contenders advancing exclusive alternative claims to control of 
government in the rural areas, commitment to those claims by a signifi- 
cant segment of the rural population, and incapacity of the agents of 
the government to suppress both the alternative coalition and the 
commitment to its claims. The alternative claims of rural rebels are 
often negative and/or separatist demands rather than proposals to take 
. 
over the central government; that does not make them less revolutionary. 
They are unlikely, however, to lead to a fundamental transfer of power 
in an entire state unless the negative or separatist contenders fashion 
coalitions with others,. .at the centers of power, including some who have 
control of armed force. 
Generally speaking, these conditions are more likely to occur 
1) where urbanization is rapid, 2) early in a long phase of urbanization, 
3) where the rural population is extensive and dispersed, yet pre- 
dominantly peasant. Such a summary can only be a crude approximation, 
since the real news is in the relative-rates of change of urban-based 
/ ' 
extraction, urban-based repression and defensive rural mobilization. 
If the trend of my argumentj'is correct, Gramsci was only partly right 
in thinking that the more thoroughly the influence of cities pervades 
the countryside, the more likely revolution is. Pervasive urban in- 
fluence makes an effective rural-urban coalition more likely. After 
a point; however, it also makes reactive mobilization less likely. 
Gramsci needed a; distinction between the necessary conditions for 
I 
revolution in the sense of multiple sovereignty and the necessary 
conditions for revolution in the sense of a fundamental transfer of 
power. I 
I 
The reactive forms of rural rebellion are only half the matter. 
In the European experience, they were the larger half: once the peasant 
revolts of the nineteenth century had faded away, most rural areas 
stayed quiet. Nevertheless, some European rural populations acted 
togeth-er after peasant revolts, and peasants as well, became historical 
memories. Andalusia's rural anarchism, Sicily's Fasci, the Po Valley's 
-socialism all drew their strength from rural proletarians, not from 
peasants. All had a proactive urge to them that was lacking in the 
2. 
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anger about p re sen t  e x p l o i t a t i o n ,  t h e  a c t o r s  claimed r i g h t s  and rewards 
which had never  be fo re  been t h e i r s .  
To avoid  confusion,  l e t  u s  remember who peasan t s  are. . . a t  
l e a s t  i n  t h e  p r e s e n t  d i scuss ion .  They a r e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  producers o r -  
ganized i n  households which y i e l d  a  s u r p l u s  t o  o u t s i d e r s ,  bu t  have 
s u b s t a n t i a l  c o n t r o l  over t h e  land  they  work and r a i s e  t h e  bulk  of 
what they  consume. By such a  d e f i n i t i o n ,  a g r a r i a n  c a p i t a l i s m  even tua l ly  
des t roys  t h e  peasant ry .  To t h e  &tent  t h a t  a g r i c u l t u r a l  l and ,  l a b o r  
and c a p i t a l  a l l  become respons ive  t o  e x t e r n a l  markets ,  t h e  c u l t i v a t o r s  
s t o p  being peasants .  That can happen through t h e  c r e a t i o n  of an 
a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o l e t a r i a t  o r  through t h e  conversion of  everyone who 
remains i n  a g r i c u l t u r e  i n t o  a  cash-crop farmer.  
.- 
.... I n  looking  a t  r e a c t i v e  peasant  movements, t hen ,  w e  were dnly  
examining t h e  f i r s t  phase of t h e  process .  La te  i n  t h e  process ,  some- 
t h i n g  q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  occas iona l ly  happens: a s s o c i a t i o n s  of workers 
o r  of producers  form, make c l a ims ,  and a c t  t o g e t h e r .  P r o l e t a r i a n i z a -  
t i o n  occurs  through t h e  ex::ension of markets  f o r  l a n d ,  l a b o r  and 
c a p i t a l  i n t o  t h e  count rys ide ,  through t h e  stepped-up demand f o r  t a x e s  
i n  cash ,  through t h e  concen t r a t ion  of  land  i n  l a r g e  hold ings .  Where 
t h e  p roces s  occu r s ,  i t  not  on ly  c r e a t e s  a  r u r a l  popula t ion  polar ized  
i n t o  a  land-poor mass and a  l and -con t ro l l i ng  e l i t e ,  i t  a l s o  tends t o  
weaken t h e  p o l i t i c a l  p o s i t i o n  of t h e  o l d  r u r a l  e l i t e .  I f  t h e  govern- 
I 
ment t o  which t h e  o l d  e l i te  was t i e d  weakens a t  t h e  same t ime,  t h e  
r e s u l t  i s  t h e  disappearance of one of  t h e  g r e a t  b a r r i e r s  t o  a la rge-  
'* 
s c a l e  r u r a l  r evo lu t iona ry  movement. 
Elsewhere i n  t h i s  volume, both  C h r i s t i n e  White and J e f f r e y  Race 
a rgue  t h a t  t h e  French promoted t h i s  e n t i r e  p roces s  i n  V i e t  Nam a s  a 
a I consequence of thetr eagerness for cash revenues from the colony. In - 
Viet Nam, By their accounts, it, took the Viet Minh to artfculate and - 
coordinate the ex2sttng rural demands for land reform, control of the 
food supply, and protection fromd'explo~tation By .large landlords. 
Conclusion 
Considering the recency of capitalism's penetration into much 
of Asia, we should not expect to find many pure examples of proactive 
rural movements in Asia. The bulk of the many Asian rural rebellions 
of the last century have been reactive in character: attempts to 
defend existing rfghts against encroachment by landlords, tax-collectors 
and other exploiters. Even the great Chinese revolution articulated 
l 
and integrated a great many essentially reactive demands: against the 
Japanese, against the rich. If that is the case, it becomes idle to 
search for correlations between radical attitudes and revolutionary 
actions, idler still to gauge the revolutionary potential of different 
segments of the rural population by means of their ideological orienta- 
t ions. 
Looking for active grievances comes closer, yet misses 
nevertheless. Grievances are fundamental to rebellion as oxygen is 
fundamental to combustion. But just as fluctuations in the oxygen 
content of the air account for little of the distribution of fire in 
the workaday world, fluctuations in grievances are not a major cause 
of the presence or absence of rebellion. For that, the polittcal 
means of acting on grievances which people have at their disposal 
matter a good deal more. Properly adapted to twentieth-century Asia, 
Antonio Gramsci's analysis of the politic.al conditions for revolution 
i provides us with an excellent start Ln determining the place of Asian 
peasants, and of rural proletarians, in contemporary revolutionary 
movements. 
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